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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy 
during the Halle period (1886-1901). I shall first track the sources of Husserl’s knowledge of 
Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. 
I shall then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to Lotze in his early work and research 
manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. In the third section, I 
examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s anti-psychologistic turn in the mid-1890s. The fourth 
section is a commentary on Husserl’s manuscript entitled “Microcosmus,” to which he 
explicitly refers in his Prolegomena, and which he planned to publish as an annex of his 
Logical Investigations. This work contains a detailed analysis of the third book of Lotze’s 
1874 Logic. The last section examines Husserl’s arguments against logical psychologism in 
his Prolegomena, which I discuss through the lens of Stumpf’s critique of psychologism in 
his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge”. I argue that Stumpf’s early works on this 
topic make it possible to establish a connection between Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s 
theory of Ideas and Husserl’s anti-psychologism. My hypothesis is that Stumpf’s analyses 
represent the background of Husserl's critique of logical psychologism in his Logical 
Investigations. I shall conclude this study by showing that Husserl’s position with respect to 
Lotze’s philosophy remains basically unchanged after the publication of his Logical 
Investigations, and that Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze pertains, in the final analysis, to the 
absence of a theory of intentionality in Lotze’s philosophy. 
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1 Thanks to M. Ramstead for his stylistic remarks on an earlier version of this paper and the Husserl Archives in 
Leuven for the permission to use and quote the manuscript “Mikrokosmos” (K I 59). An earlier and shorter 
version of this paper has been published in Spanish under the title: “Hermann Lotze y la génesis de la filosofía 
temprana de Husserl”, Apeiron, Estudios de filosofia, vol. 3, 2015, p. 13-35. 
Husserl once said of Hermann Lotze that he was one of the greatest philosophers since Kant. 
(Briefwechsel IX, p. 154) Husserl’s reverent remark about the Göttingen philosopher shows 
not only his respect for his philosophy, but also the central place Lotze deserves in the history 
of philosophy during the second half of the nineteenth century. Most commentaries on 
Husserl’s relationship to Lotze during that period have emphasized his debt to Lotze's 
interpretation of the Platonic theory of Ideas in his 1874 Logic. Although this aspect of 
Husserl’s relationship to Lotze is indeed decisive in the interpretation of his own Platonism, it 
does not itself explain why Husserl considered Lotze one of the most important researchers of 
his time, as he once again asserted in 1909 in his appraisal on A. Reinach’s habilitation thesis. 
(Briefwechsel, II, p. 206) The historical significance granted to Lotze’s philosophy can be 
measured in part by the influence he has had on the history of philosophy, not only in 
Germany but also in Great Britain and America. The historian John Merz, a student of Lotze 
in the mid-1860s and the author of the monumental History of European Thought in the XIXth 
Century in Great Britain, has pointed out that Lotze’s philosophy was at that time considered 
authoritative among the British idealists, nearly on equal footing with Hegel and Kant. 
But of the Germans who followed the classic days of Idealism none was more 
zealously studied, more deeply respected, and more frequently plundered (sit venia 
verbo) than Lotze. His influence was immeasurable, less only than that of Kant and 
Hegel. […] Many Britons even came into personal relation with Lotze; indeed, at one 
time it was almost a fashion to spend a period of study at Gottingen University, so as 
to receive philosophical wisdom from the master's own lips. (J. Merz, 1938, p. 256) 
Merz here refers to the generation of British philosophers who succeeded the idealists and 
who were mainly interested in Lotze’s scientific work and in his contribution to the 
emergence of the “new psychology”.2 In America, William James, whom Husserl held in 
																																																								
2 George Croom Robertson, a student of Alexander Bain and co-founder of the famous journal Mind, studied 
with Lotze and the physicist Weber in Göttingen in 1862, and we know that he encouraged William Robertson 
Smith to attend Lotze’s lectures. During his stay in Göttingen, Robertson Smith maintained close relationships 
with Carl Stumpf and the mathematician Felix Klein, and we also know that he acted as an emissary of Brentano 
during his trip to England in the early 1870s. (cf. B. Maier, 2009) James Sully, the author of several influential 
books in psychology, studied with Lotze in the late 1860s and is known to have reviewed several of Stumpf’s 
works for Mind. (J. Sully, 1878; 1884; 1886; 1891) James Ward, who also studied with Lotze in Göttingen in the 
1870s, is the author of the article "Psychology" published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which is the basis of 
his major 1918 work Psychological Principles, in which he acknowledges his debt to Lotze, Brentano and “his 
Austrian connections”. (1918, p. IX) His student G. F. Stout, the mentor of Moore and Russell, was deeply 
interested in the work of Brentano and his students, and Bell has said of his book Analytic Psychology (1896) 
that it is essentially “a presentation, for an English audience, of the doctrines which have emerged some 22 years 
earlier in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.” (Bell, 1999, p. 201) That is why it has been said that Stout 
served as a mediator between his students Moore and Russsell, on the one hand, and Brentano and his students in 
the field of descriptive psychology, on the other hand. (see van der Schaar, 1996, 2013) Bell examined the 
factors and forces responsible for the emergence of analytic philosophy and argued that the most important 
factor concerns the debates over the emergence of the new psychology: “Moore, I have suggested, is best seen as 
the major, though by no means the first, British participant in an existing debate whose other participants 
included Ward, Stout, Russell, Meinong, Stumpf, Husserl, Twardowski and Brentano. Many of the terms and 
goals of this debate originated in Germany, during the 1870s, in the attempts by philosophers, physiologists, 
theologians and others to come to terms with, and contribute to, the emergence of psychology as a discipline in 
its own right”. (Bell, 1999, p. 208) Of course, I would add the name of Lotze as the central piece of this complex 
puzzle.  
great esteem, had also been greatly influenced by Brentano and Lotze, “the two great masters 
of psychological analysis and introspection.” (Stumpf, 1927, p. 225)3 
In Germany, Lotze’s work was a major reference in philosophy when the young Husserl 
began his philosophical studies shortly after Lotze’s death in 1881. (R. Pester, 1977) The 
influence of Lotze’s philosophy in Germany is associated with three of his prestigious 
students in Göttingen, all born in the so-called Year of Revolution in Europe, namely Gottlob 
Frege (1848-1925), Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Carl Stumpf (1848-1936). 
Windelband studied under Lotze in the early 1870s and is known as the leader of the so-called 
Southwestern or Baden school of neo-Kantianism, whose main members were Heinrich 
Rickert and Bruno Bauch, the latter of which was Frege’s colleague in Jena from 1911 
onwards. Rickert and Bauch developed a philosophy of culture, based on an interpretation of 
Lotze’s theory of values, which had become one of the dominant trends in German 
philosophy by the end of the nineteenth century. (see G. Misch, 1912; P. F. Linke, 1926, 
1924)  
Frege pursued his studies in mathematics in Göttingen between 1871 and 1873, and although 
he only attended Lotze’s lecture on philosophy of religion, many of his ideas were anticipated 
in Lotze’s logic.4 In the context of this study, it is important to recall that Frege has long been 
considered the father of the two main traditions that have dominated the history of philosophy 
starting from the beginning of the twentieth century, namely phenomenology (see D. W. 
Smith 2013) and analytic philosophy (M. Dummett, 1993). Commentators of Frege, including 
H. Sluga (1984, 1980) and G. Gabriel (1989, 2002, 2013), have called into question 
Dummett’s thesis about the Fregean origin of analytic philosophy and stressed the alleged 
influence of Lotze and the Baden neo-Kantians on the young Frege, such that Frege could 
plausibly be considered a Neokantianer. They further argued “that at least early analytic 
philosophy has its roots in the tradition of continental philosophy, especially in the philosophy 
of Hermann Lotze”. (Gabriel, 2002, p. 39) However, even if one recognizes Lotze’s influence 
on Frege, this does not ipso facto make him a neo-Kantian, unless one uses the concept of 
neo-Kantianism in a sense broad enough to include the Lotze’s philosophy.5 																																																								
3 In a series of articles on James and Lotze, O. Krausharr nicely summarizes Lotze’s major influence on James’s 
Psychology: “There was so much in Lotze that coincided with and paralleled the course of James’s ideas, that he 
became for a time very much enmeshed in Lotze’s Problemlage. The philosophical position that is developed in 
the Principles of Psychology leans heavily upon Lotze’s philosophical and psychological doctrines. He did not 
extricate himself therefrom fully until the final working out of his philosophy of pure experience.” (1939, p. 458) 
Krausharr (1936, p. 245) rightly pointed out that it was under the influence of Stumpf’s Raumbuch that James 
became interested in Lotze’s theory of local signs. 
4 See L. Kreiser’s biography of Frege (2001, p. 86-111). Frege himself acknowledged Lotze’s influence on his 
thought, as evidenced by his colleague B. Bauch: “I heard it myself from the mouth of Frege, our great 
mathematician, that for his mathematical—and, if I may add what Frege modestly did not mention—
epochmaking investigations, impulses from Lotze were of decisive importance”. (in S. Schlotter, 2006, p. 45) 
See also G. Gabriel (1989) who convincingly shows the influence of Lotze’s logic on Frege. 
5 Gabriel’s arguments, which support his construal of Frege as a neo-Kantian, are mainly based on Frege’s 
personal acquaintance with his colleague B. Bauch in Jena and on the alleged affinities of Frege’s 
epistemological positions with those of neo-Kantian Windelband, even if Frege almost never refers to neo-
Kantians. Paul F. Linke, who was Frege’s colleague in Jena starting from 1907 and one of his strongest 
supporters in Germany, excludes any influence of his fellow neo-Kantians in Jena on Frege. (Linke, 1946, p. 77) 
Linke was close to Husserl and to the Brentanian circles. He published in Husserl’s Jahrbuch and he was one of 
the first to emphasize the influence of Frege on Husserl; (Linke, 1926, p. 228-229) he is the author of “Gottlob 
Finally, the name of Carl Stumpf is of particular importance in this study because of his close 
relationship with Lotze during the six years he spent in Göttingen (1867-1873) and later with 
Husserl in Halle, where he held a chair in philosophy from 1884 to 1889. Stumpf attended 
Lotze’s lectures, and successfully defended a dissertation on Plato (1869) and then his 
habilitation thesis on mathematical axioms (1870) under his direction. At age 22, Stumpf 
became privatdozent at the University of Göttingen, where he was Lotze’s colleague. During 
his three years as privatdozent in Göttingen, he maintained a close relationship with Lotze, 
and undertook extensive research on the topic of space perception, which led to the 
publication of his book On the Origin of the Representation of Space in 1873, dedicated to 
Lotze.6  
Lotze’s three main students in Germany find a common starting point in a theme that Lotze 
had already set up in his logic, organized around the epistemological issues arising from the 
unprecedented development of both the new psychology and logic, which in turn led to many 
reform projects at the time. These epistemological questions are at the heart of the early 
debates over psychologism, to which contributed not only Frege (1884), but also Windelband 
(1877) and Stumpf (1891). Although the positions advocated by these students of Lotze are 
slightly different, their struggle against psychologism converges towards Husserl’s position in 
his Prolegomena. This line of criticism targets a research program not very different from 
Quine’s program to naturalize epistemology in contemporary philosophy. At that time, this 
program was widespread among philosophers such as W. Wundt and J. Stuart Mill, for 																																																																																																																																																																													
Frege als Philosoph” and in his later writings showed great interest in Frege. (see U. Dathe, 2000) Through his 
conversations with Linke, Frege might have been informed of Husserl’s work and that of Brentano’s students in 
general. In any case, it is worth remembering that Brentano’s students were responsible for the early reception of 
Frege’s work in Germany. Indeed, in 1882, Stumpf received a letter from Frege, in which he described the basic 
ideas of his Begriffsschrift in great detail and asked Stumpf to publish a review of his book, which, at that time, 
had been ignored since its publication in 1879. Frege feared above all that the works he was preparing on the 
logical foundation of arithmetic would suffer the same fate as his Begriffsschrifft and approached Stumpf for 
advice. Stumpf responded to Frege’s letter a few weeks later by promising to review his Begriffsschrift and 
recommended that Frege first publish his research in vernacular language (gewöhnlich) and postpone the 
publication of his theory of arithmetic based on the technical language of his Begriffsschrift. Yet, as we know, it 
was not Stumpf but Anton Marty, another of Brentano’s students, who in 1884 reviewed and commented Frege’s 
theory of judgment and his Begriffsschrift in the second article in a series of papers on subjectless propositions. 
(A. Marty, 1884) Finally, let us mention Benno Kerry, another student of Brentano. Kerry was very interested in 
Frege’s works (see V. Peckhaus, 1994). 
6 See Stumpf (1917; 1976, p. 18 ff) for an account of his activity in Göttingen between 1870 and 1873. The main 
subject of Stumpf’s Raumbuch is the nativism-empiricism controversy; Stumpf’s starting point is Lotze’s theory 
of local signs, which represents, according to many, his main contribution to the problem of space perception. 
Lotze responded to Stumpf’s criticism in his “Mitteilung an Stumpf,” which is annexed to Stumpf’s work. (1873, 
p. 315-324) After leaving Göttingen, Stumpf continued to consider Lotze’s work. Besides his reminiscences of 
Lotze published in Kantstudien (Stumpf, 1917) and the constant references to his work, Stumpf reviewed most 
of Lotze’s posthumous works published in German between 1882 and 1892. (see D. Fisette, 2005d) In 1893, he 
published an article in which he revised his position on local signs. (Stumpf, 1893) In his inaugural address as 
Rector of the University of Berlin, delivered in 1907 under the title “The renaissance of philosophy”, Stumpf 
associates Lotze’s thought with a revival of German philosophy in the mid-nineteenth century. Stumpf 
distinguishes two main orientations of German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century, the first 
being neo-Kantianism, which advocated a return to Kant, and the second being the so-called 
Erfahrungsphilosophie. At the time, in Germany at least, Erfahrungsphilosophie was the common denominator 
of several schools of thought, including the school of Brentano, which sought to practice philosophy in the spirit 
of the natural sciences. Stumpf maintains that, through their empirical work in the field of philosophy of mind 
and physiological psychology, philosophers like Lotze and Fechner contributed significantly to a renaissance of 
philosophy in Germany. 
example, who are the main targets of Frege, Stumpf, and Husserl in their criticism of logical 
psychologism. Husserl’s main argument against Mill is based on the ideal or objective 
character of the laws of logic, which Husserl conceived of in terms of Geltung. But while 
Frege and the neo-Kantians advocated a solution to this problem that involved the outright 
rejection of psychology as a philosophical discipline7, Brentano’s students recognized, as 
Lotze had as well, the indispensable contribution of psychology to the theory of knowledge. 
This theme is at the heart of the young Husserl’s research during the Halle period and it is 
sufficient on its own to justify his judgment on the importance of Lotze’s philosophy to the 
development of his phenomenology and pure logic during that period. 
The purpose of this study is to assess Husserl’s debt to Lotze’s philosophy during the Halle 
period. I am mainly interested in the genesis of the young Husserl’s thought from his arrival 
in Halle in 1886 to the publication of his Hauptwerk in 1900-1901. I shall first track the 
sources of Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s philosophy during his studies with Brentano in 
Vienna and then with Stumpf in Halle. I shall then briefly comment on Husserl’s references to 
Lotze in his early work and research manuscripts for the second volume of his Philosophy of 
Arithmetic. In the third section, I examine Lotze’s influence on Husserl’s anti-psychologistic 
turn in the mid-1890s. The fourth section is a commentary on Husserl’s manuscript entitled 
“Microcosmus,” to which he explicitly refers in his Prolegomena, and which he planned to 
publish as an annex of his Logical Investigations. This work contains a detailed analysis of 
the third book of Lotze’s 1874 Logic. The last section examines Husserl’s arguments against 
logical psychologism in his Prolegomena, which I discuss through the lens of Stumpf’s 
critique of psychologism in his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge”. I argue that 
Stumpf’s early works on this topic make it possible to establish a connection between Lotze’s 
interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas and Husserl’s anti-psychologism. My hypothesis is 
that Stumpf’s analyses represent the background of Husserl's critique of logical psychologism 
in his Logical Investigations. I shall conclude this study by showing that Husserl’s position 
with respect to Lotze’s philosophy remains basically unchanged after the publication of his 
Logical Investigations, and that Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze pertains, in the final 
analysis, to the absence of a theory of intentionality in Lotze’s philosophy. 
 
I. Husserl’s main sources: Brentano and Stumpf 
The young Husserl inherited his sympathy for the philosophy of Lotze via his relationship 
with Brentano in Vienna (1884-1886) and then with Stumpf in Halle, where he arrived in the 
fall of 1886 to complete his habilitation thesis. There is indeed a direct filiation between 
Lotze, on the one hand, and Brentano and his students, on the other, including the young 																																																								
7 Windelband’s and Rickert’s positions on psychology come out clearly from their classification of sciences into 
idiographic and natural sciences, which was intended to replace the traditional classification based on the 
distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften. Windelband’s and Rickert’s main argument is that, 
methodologically, the new psychology was more akin to natural than to moral science and therefore could not be 
considered an idiographic science. In his 1927 lecture Natur und Geist, Husserl criticizes their interpretation of 
Lotze’s theory of values from the perspective of a philosophy of culture based on a “critical science of values” 
and accuses them of ruling out intentional psychology, to which Husserl assigns a central place in his Freiburg 
phenomenology. (Hua XXXIII, p. 80-81, 95) 
Husserl. Indeed, we know that Brentano, before obtaining his chair at Würzburg in 1872, was 
not habilitated to supervise theses, and that is why, in 1867, he recommended to Stumpf, and 
later to Anton Marty, that they move to Göttingen in order to study with Lotze. Although 
Brentano’s philosophical program constitutes the main background of Marty’s and Stumpf’s 
thought, one cannot underestimate the influence of Lotze’s philosophy on Stumpf’s 
philosophy during the six years he spent in Göttingen. (Stumpf, 1895, p. 735) 
In his correspondence with Stumpf, as well as in his Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, Brentano unequivocally expressed his esteem for Lotze and indicated several 
aspects of his work that he considered lasting contributions to philosophy. In a passage from a 
letter to Stumpf dated November 3, 1867, Brentano explains why Lotze was among the best 
German philosophers at the time to supervise his studies: 
Because I could not name any other professor of philosophy whose doctrine in its 
essential aspects I do not hold to be false, and because Lotze, despite all that he 
lacks, is in many ways remarkable. Notably, his philosophical method, his 
emphasis on experience and observation, the way he uses scientific results, the 
caution and meticulousness with which he exposes his theses, all set him apart, and 
advantageously so, from most other scholars of our time. And I do not know 
anyone else from whom you could learn more in this regard. (Brentano, 1989, p. 3; 
see Stumpf, 1817, p. 2) 
Brentano had even taken steps to facilitate Lotze’s hiring at Würzburg, in order to keep his 
students in the same university. (Brentano 1989, p. 11) Elsewhere in his correspondence with 
Stumpf, Brentano criticizes Lotze for the noxious influence of Kantianism on his thinking, for 
his incomplete knowledge of ancient philosophy, and for his inadequate classification of 
mental phenomena. He nevertheless acknowledges that Lotze’s writings were “superior to 
those of most contemporary philosophers”. Brentano confirms these views in the preface to 
his Psychology. There, he acknowledges the influence of Lotze on his thought (Brentano 
2008, p. 4) and repeatedly refers to two of his important works, Medical Psychology and 
Mikrocosmos, thoroughly discussing Lotze’s views on emotions and feelings (Brentano, 2008, 
p. 167 f.; p. 262 f.; 268 f.) along with his classification of acts. (Brentano 2008, p. 206 f.; p. 
254 f.)  
Furthermore, considering Lotze’s great notoriety at the time, in Germany and abroad, and 
Stumpf’s close relationship with the Göttingen philosopher, there is no doubt that Lotze was a 
key factor not only in Brentano’s career, but also in Stumpf’s and Marty’s. Thanks to Lotze, 
Stumpf inherited Brentano’s chair in Würzburg in 1874; the correspondence between 
Brentano and Stumpf also indicates that Lotze had a hand in Marty’s hiring in Czernowirz in 
1875 and in Prague in 1880. For, besides Brentano’s and Stumpf’s numerous manoeuvres to 
promote Marty’s hiring in Czernowitz, we know that Stumpf went so far as to personally 
travel to Göttingen in order to gain the support of Lotze and of his student Baumann for 
Marty's candidature. Shortly after he resigned in Wurzburg, Brentano undertook discussions 
with the University of Vienna to fill the position left vacant since the departure of F. Lott, a 
position he obtained thanks once again to Lotze, who spoke with the Austrian ministry in 
favour of his candidacy. (Stumpf, 1976, p. 34; Lotze, 2003, p. 595-596) 
As we can see, the close relationship between Brentano, Stumpf and Lotze, both personally 
and philosophically, may have favourably disposed the young Husserl towards the Göttingen 
philosopher. However, Husserl’s first significant exposure to Lotze’s philosophy occurred 
during his two years of study with Brentano in Vienna (1884-1886), where he attended 
several of the great scholar’s seminars (see R. Rollinger, 1999, p. 17), namely those on logic 
and psychology, in which Brentano occasionally discussed the work of Lotze.8 As Husserl 
explains in his “Reminiscences of Franz Brentano,” Brentano’s main concern at that time was 
descriptive psychology. (Husserl, Hua XXV, p. 307) Husserl’s correspondence with Brentano 
confirms his interest in Brentano’s research on descriptive psychology during the Halle period 
(Briefwechsel I, p. 6) The results of Brentano’s research were the subject of lectures he held in 
1890-1891 on descriptive psychology (which he also calls “psychognosy” or “descriptive 
phenomenology”), in which he subjected his earlier conception of psychology to substantial 
revisions. In this regard, Brentano might have been influenced by Lotze, who frequently used 
the notions of descriptive psychology and phenomenology in his published writings and 
lectures. (G. Misch, 1912, p. L-LV; H. Orth, 1995, 1997) 
Two years after Husserl completed studies in Vienna, Brentano recommended his student to 
Stumpf, who at that time had held a chair in Halle since 1884, in the hopes that he might also 
find an outstanding interlocutor for the mathematical aspect of his research in Georg Cantor, 
who was then a colleague of Stumpf in Halle. As Malvine Husserl reported in her memoirs, 
during the early Halle period, “Stumpf was the guide, adviser and fatherly friend.” (M. 
Husserl, 1988, p. 114) Stumpf enthusiastically welcomed the young philosopher and 
mathematician and later confirmed that Husserl “was first my student, later an instructor, and 
became intimately associated with me scientifically and as a friend” in his autobiography. 
(Stumpf, 1930, p. 399) This event marks the beginning of a lasting and fruitful relationship, 
which lasted until Stumpf’s death in 1936.9 
Husserl thus arrived in Halle in the fall of 1886 to complete his habilitation thesis under the 
supervision of Stumpf. During his first year of study in Halle, the young Husserl attended 
Stumpf’s lectures and was subjected to several examinations for his habilitation. Indeed, 
Husserl attended Stumpf’s lecture on psychology during the winter semester 1886-1887, as 
well as his lecture on logic and on the encyclopedia of philosophy during the summer 
semester 1887. Husserl’s notes on Stumpf’s lectures, which are housed in the Husserl 
Archives in Leuven, bear witness to Husserl’s acquaintance with Lotze’s logic and 
psychology. In his lecture on psychology, Stumpf highly recommended the writings of 
Brentano and especially of Lotze, which he comments at length. He particularly appreciated 
his article “Seele und Seelenleben” because it constitutes the most developed and harmonious 
																																																								
8 Although Husserl acquired a copy of Lotze’s Microkosmos as early as 1880 (K. Schuhmann, 1977, p. 8), 
nothing indicates that he was interested in Lotze’s philosophy at that time; and it is unlikely that he had any 
direct contact with Lotze, who arrived in Berlin in April 1881 and passed away in July of the same year. 
9 In his last letter to Masaryk, dated January 3, 1935, Husserl writes about his friend Stumpf: “Unfortunately, 
they share in this regard destiny with my old teacher and friend C. Stumpf. The eighty-seven years old men still 
lives in full mental freshness, busy with general philosophical problems, especially epistemological one. Except 
that he suffers very badly from the new time, into which he cannot recognize himself. I am myself so much more 
affected but I will remain silent in this regard.” (Briefwechsel I, p. 119)  
presentation written by Lotze on the subject. He also positively comments Lotze’s main 
psychological writings and concludes that part of his lecture with praise for his psychology: 
We are particularly indebted to Lotze for the orientation of psychology in 
Germany, which emphasizes the careful observation of the details of our psychical 
life and introspection. By studying these two authors [Brentano and Lotze], you 
will acquire the best training. (Stumpf, Q11-II p. 49) 
I cannot comment here the rich content of Stumpf’s lectures. Nevertheless, I would like to 
mention the long discussion Stumpf devoted to Lotze’s position on sensations and location in 
§ 26, “Raumvorstellung of Gesichtssinnes” (Q11-II, p. 40-49), as well as his detailed 
exposition of Lotze’s theory of local signs (Q11-II, p. 49 f.), and his examination of the main 
stakes in the nativism-empiricism debate, which constitutes the central topic of his Raumbuch. 
Stumpf’s syllabi on logic and psychology are already known (Stumpf, 1999a, 1999b), but 
Husserl’s notes on these lectures are worth mentioning because they contain, among other 
things, a long discussion on the different meanings of Lotze’s notion of being, where Stumpf 
implicitly refers to Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas.10 We shall see that 
Lotze’s work on Plato’s theory of Ideas is central in Stumpf’s dissertation on Plato and in his 
habilitation thesis on mathematical axioms. 
If one judges by the themes imposed on Husserl for his nostrification test, which was intended 
to homologate his Austrian diploma, one can assume that Husserl’s knowledge of Lotze’s 
psychology and logic, acquired mainly through Stumpf’s lectures, was not superficial. For, we 
must assume that Husserl was sufficiently prepared to address the main questions of this 
exam, which were about “Lotze’s theory of local signs, the history of the theories of space as 
well as the relationship between mathematics and logic” (Stumpf in Gerlach, 1994, p. 184), 
three central topics in the young Husserl’s research in Halle, as Stumpf explained in his final 
report. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of July 1887, Husserl successfully defended his habilitation. 
His Habilitationsschrift, in which he explored the theme of the psychological origin of the 
fundamental concepts of arithmetic, was published a few months later under the title “On the 
concept of number: Psychological analysis”. In his report, Stumpf noted the remarkable 
analytical skills of the candidate and emphasized the important methodological contribution to 
descriptive psychology in this work. (Stumpf in H. Gerlach, 1994, p. 173) In 1887, a few 
months after defending his habilitation thesis, Husserl delivered his inaugural lecture at the 																																																								
10 „It should be considered that it is precisely here that there can be a confusion between being in the sense of a 
thing and being in the sense: something exists, there is a god. Here a thing, a being is posited, recognized. So 
here we have two meanings of being: 1) in the sense of existing (Bestehen), that is the existential (existentiale) 
meaning; 2) being, where a thing is meant as opposed to a mere relation, a mere property. This sense of being is 
not taken into consideration in logic. The being in the logical sense merely means the function of assent, 
recognition, and it has nothing to do with the being of a thing” (“Es ist zu erwägen, daß gerade hier eine 
Verwechslung vorliegen kann zwischen dem Seienden im Sinn eines Dinges und dem Sein in dem Sinn: Es 
besteht etwas, Es gibt einen Gott. Hier wird ein Ding, ein Seiendes gesetzt, anerkannt. Wir haben also hier das 
Sein in zweifacher Bedeutung: 1) im Sinne des Bestehens, das ist das existentiale; 2) das Sein, wo ein Ding 
gegenüber einem bloßen Verhältnis, einer bloßen Eigenschaft gemeint ist. Dieses Sein kommt in der Logik nicht 
in Betracht. Das Sein der Logik bedeutet bloß die Funktion der Zustimmung, Anerkennung, und hat nichts mit 
dem Dingsein zu tun.“ (Stumpf, Q11-II, p. 63-64) 
 
University of Halle on the topic “Über Ziele und Aufgaben der Metaphysik” and became 
privatdozent at this university, a position he held until he left for Göttingen in 1901. Although 
Husserl's inaugural lecture has been lost, we now have access to the transcript of his notes on 
Stumpf’s lecture on metaphysics (Stumpf, 2015), which contain some discussions of Lotze. 
(D. Fisette, 2015b) Metaphysical issues were central to Husserl’s teaching in Halle, and we 
know that several lectures held by Husserl during this period were either specifically on 
metaphysics, or on related topics, such as theism, free will, or Lotze’s proofs of the existence 
of God. (cf. H. Gerlach and H. Sepp, 1994, p. 35 f.)  
II. Lotze and Husserl’s anti-psychologistic turn 
The Halle period is one of the richest in the development of Husserl's thought, and it has been 
repeatedly commented in Husserl studies. However, besides the studies that have focused on 
Husserl’s assessment of Lotze’s logic in his Logical Investigations,11 the importance of Lotze 
in the genesis of Husserl’s phenomenology during this period has not been sufficiently 
investigated. Yet there are many indications in Husserl’s work, namely in his 1896 lecture on 
logic, which confirm that Lotze is not foreign to Husserl’s abandonment of the research 
program that guided his early work, and that the reform of logic he began to carry out in the 
mid-1890s goes hand in hand with his anti-psychologistic turn. The other main aspect of 
Husserl’s research during this period relates to descriptive psychology, on the basis of which 
he defines his own phenomenology (in the Logical Investigations) and his theory of 
intentionality, which he elaborated in several writings of this period. These include his 1894 
“Psychological studies” and several research manuscripts, such as “Intentional object,” where 
he critically examines K. Twardowski’s book On the Content and Object of Presentations 
(1894). We shall see that this manuscript bears the mark of Lotze’s influence and constitutes 
an essential complement to another important manuscript entitled “Microcosmus” (1895-
1897), in which Husserl initiates a critical examination of Lotze’s theory of knowledge in his 
“greater” Logic. Finally, Husserl discusses Lotze’s positions on space perception in his draft 
of a Raumbuch, which belongs to the same period. We shall see that accounting for the 
Lotzean elements in the young Husserl’s work opens new perspectives on this complicated 
period in the genesis of his thought. 
Let me first say a few words about the project of a Raumbuch, which was part of Husserl's 
research for the second volume of his Philosophy of Arithmetic. Those fragments from this 
project that have survived evince a marked interest for the psychological question of the 
origin of space perception and for the nativism-empiricism debate. Husserl’s position in these 
manuscripts, and especially in the important fragment §10, are very close to the kind of 
“nativism” advocated by Stumpf in his own Raumbuch, and there one also finds discussions 
on Lotze’s theory of local signs. (Hua XXI, p. 269, 309) In an article published two years later 
entitled “Psychological studies for elementary logic,” Husserl describes the work of Lotze and 
Stumpf on space perception as “masterful research”. (Hua XXII, p. 123) Although this project 
was never carried out, we can still distill some results, which are partly exposed in his 
“Psychological studies”. The most important of these lies in the concept of psychological part 																																																								
11 There are indeed quite a few studies on Husserl’s relationship to Lotze’s philosophy. Let me here mention the 
latest: F. Dastur (1994); C. Beyer (1996); K. Hauser (2003); A. Dewalque (2012a; 2012b); P. A. Varga (2013).  
or moment, on which is based Stumpf’s main position in § 5 of his Raumbuch. Now, the first 
version of Husserl’s theory of parts and wholes, which he develops in the first part of this 
article, is based primarily on Stumpf’s ideas, as Husserl acknowledges in this article and later 
in the third Investigation. (Hua XXII, p. 92, 94) 
Part-whole relations pertain to a general theory of relations, which Husserl briefly mentions in 
his Philosophy of Arithmetic and outlines in this article. In a footnote to chapter III of this 
book, in which he deals with collective relations (2003, p. 84), Husserl refers to Lotze’s 
Metaphysics and to the first volume of Stumpf’s Psychology of Sound (1883, p. 96), in which 
he introduced his famous notion of fusion in the context of a study of basic relations 
(Grundverhälnisse). Drawing on the work of Stumpf and Lotze, Husserl distinguishes two 
classes of relations: intentional and primary relations. The latter class of relations bear the 
character of primary contents (or sensory content) and they have a “peculiar phenomenal 
character”. (Husserl, 2003, p. 71)12 
Each relation belonging to this class, for example the relation of analogy between two 
contents, is included non-intentionally in a presentation. (2003, p. 71) The relations belonging 
to the class of intentional relations pertain exclusively to the class of psychical phenomena. 
They are characterized by acts, which relate and unify several contents. The main difference 
between these two classes of relations is that, for the first class, “the relation is immediately 
given along with representing the terms, as a moment of the same representational content,” 
(2003, p. 72) whereas for the second, in order to represent the relation, one has to perform “a 
reflexive act of representing bearing upon the relating act”. (2003, p. 73)13  
As for the class of intentional relations, Husserl’s conception considerably evolved from that 
in his first works, in which he uncritically adopted Brentano’s immanent theory. This 
uncritical adoption lasted until 1894, as shown in his work “Intentional objects,” where he 
critically examines Twardowski’s treatment of the problem of objectless presentations. In 
addition to the significant contribution of this text to Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the 
fifth Investigation (D. Fisette, forthcoming; 2003), the problem of intentional objects is not 
unrelated to the central issue in Husserl’s 1895-1897 manuscript on Lotze’s logic and his 
interpretation of Plato’s Ideas in terms of Geltung. Indeed, Lotze himself in his greater 1874 
logic (Lotze 1884, p. 504) explicitly related the problem he sought to solve with the concept 
of Geltung and that of objects of thought (Gedankendinge) in Medieval philosophy. This issue 
is related to Brentano’s and Twardowski’s postulation of an immanent mode of existence for 
intentional objects of thought. In his 1894 manuscript, Husserl repudiates this postulate and 
accuses Twardowski of conflating objective and subjective intention in his discussion with 
Bolzano. Husserl (1990, p. 168) argues that the discourse on the in-existence of intentional 
objects is an improper way of speaking and calls into question the view advocated by 
Twardowski and Brentano, according to which an existential valid affirmative judgment of 																																																								
12 Husserl seeks to avoid Brentano’s concept of physical phenomenon because it does not properly designate an 
analogy, gradation, etc., and he instead prefers the concept of primary or immanent content. Nevertheless, the 
concept of intentional inexistence, which is Brentano’s criterion for the distinction between these two classes of 
phenomena, remains the basis for the classification of relations in this work. (Husserl, 2003, p. 73) 
13 The importance of the distinction between these two classes of relations is confirmed by several other texts 
belonging to the Halle period. (see D. Fisette, 2000) 
the form “A exists” presupposes the in-existence of an intentional object. (Husserl, 1990, p. 
145) Husserl’s solution in this work, in his unpublished review of Twardowski’s book 
(Husserl, 1994, p. 391-392) and in the Appendix to §§ 11 and 20 of the fifth Investigation, 
rests on the identification of intentional and valid objects.14 This solution is very likely 
inspired by Lotze, as shown by the following passage, in which Husserl summarizes his 
solution to the problem of intentional objects following the paradigm of objects of judgment, 
i.e., states of affairs: 
If, for example, we impute an object to the proposition, as what is represented by 
means of its signification content and indeed its whole signification content (thus 
we have in mind not the mere object for which the subject of the proposition 
stands, the characteristic corresponding to the predicate, and the like)—then by 
that we pick out the “state of affairs,” which subsists if the proposition holds true, 
and does not subsist if it does not hold true. If the question about the distinction 
between true and intentional objects in the case of nominal representations has led 
us to existential assertions in which those representations function as subject 
representations, and which, depending on the circumstances, were advanced 
absolutely or were understood as only conditioned, then all of that carries over 
analogically to the case now at hand, if only we replace the assertions of existence 
with assertions of validity (Gültigkeitsbehauptungen) (A is valid [A gilt]). But 
these assertions, too, can be meant, at one time absolutely, and at another time 
under hypothesis. The circumstance that with reference to each proposition an 
equivalent existential proposition can be found, which, however its signification 
content may be modified, represents the same state of affairs as the proposition 
originally given, in a way reduces the present case back to the earlier one, 
comprising merely nominal representations. And so the talk of intentional and true 
objects agrees in the two cases. (transl. modified), (Husserl, 1994, p. 376-377)  
Several other aspects of this writing are relevant in the context of this study, namely the 
parallel Husserl establishes between the problem of the imaginary in mathematics and that of 
objectless presentations in psychology. For the mathematical problem pertains to justification 
in mathematical calculation that employ imaginary numbers. We know that this problem was 
at the heart of Husserl's concerns ever since his habilitation thesis (Husserl, 2003, p. 307) and 
constitutes one of the main factors at the origin of the abandonment of the research program 
of Philosophy of Arithmetic. Likewise, Husserl's remarks on assumptions (Annahmen) 
(Husserl, 1994, p. 363-368) constitute an important step towards the final solution that he 
proposed to the problem of imaginary numbers through his doctrine of definite multiplicities, 
which in turn represents the cornerstone of his Wissenschaftslehre. (Husserl, 2001; D. Fisette,  
forthcoming; 2003) 
The next step in the genesis of the Logical Investigations leads to the issue of Husserl’s anti-
psychologistic turn, which occurred between 1894 and 1896, i.e., between the definitive 
abandonment of the research program that guided Husserl since his habilitation thesis and the 
new program based on pure logic. The “cause” of this paradigm shift has long been associated 
with Frege’s 1984 review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic and the so-called Fregean 																																																								
14 Husserl writes: “It need only be acknowledged that the intentional object of a presentation is the same as its 
actual object, and on occasion the same as its external object, and that it is absurd to distinguish between them. 
The transcendent object would not be the object of this presentation, if it was not its intentional object. This is 
plainly a merely analytic proposition. The object of the presentation, of the ‘intention’, is and means what is 
presented, the intentional object”. (Husserl, 1982b, p. 127)  
reading of Husserl’s phenomenology, which I mentioned earlier. We have no evidence that 
corroborates the alleged influence Frege might have had on Husserl’s “conversion,” but there 
are good reasons to assume that Husserl could not remain indifferent to Frege’s criticism. I 
cannot address the issue as to whether Frege’s review had a triggering effect on Husserl’s 
turn, and it is not necessarily the best way of addressing the conversion. For we know from 
the correspondence they exchanged in 1891 (Briefwechsel, Bd. VI, p. 106-118) that Husserl 
knew the work of Frege, which he extensively discusses in his Philosophy of Arithmetic. (D. 
Fisette, 2004) How could Husserl have possibly ignored the contribution of this student of 
Lotze to an issue that animated the entirety of his thought during this period? Moreover, we 
know that Frege’s criticism in his correspondence and in his review of Husserl’s first book is 
based on several distinctions that are essential to Husserl’s pure logic, including the 
distinctions between proposition and concept, between subjective and objective presentations, 
between Sinn and Bedeutung, etc. (cf. Husserl 1982a, p. 201)15 
That being said, the two names that Husserl explicitly associates with his anti-psychologistic 
turn and his conversion to Platonism are those of Bolzano and Lotze, as Husserl confirms in 
his correspondence with Brentano: “These conceptions of Bolzano [representation and 
proposition in itself] have produced a major effect on me, as did Lotze’s interpretation of 
Plato’s theory of Ideas.” (Briefwechsel, I, p. 39)16 As early as 1896, in his lecture on logic, 
Husserl recognizes his debt to Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre with respect to his pure logic, 
understood as a theory of science, and he also refers to Lotze’s thesis that arithmetic is only 
ein Stück from logic, a thesis formulated at the beginning of his Logic. Husserl stresses the 
great importance of Lotze’s thesis for his own reform of logic and asserts that it is the most 
powerful tool invented by the human mind for the purposes of deduction.17 Lotze’s logicist 																																																								
15 These distinctions are also central in Husserl’s criticism of Twardowski. (Husserl, 1994, p. 374-375, 388-390; 
1982b, p. 125-127) In a footnote to his Prolegomena (1982a, p. 318), Husserl confirms Frege’s influence: “G. 
Frege’s stimulating work Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884, p. vi) (I need hardly say that I no longer 
approve of my own fundamental criticisms of Frege’s anti-psychologistic position set forth in my Philosophie 
der Arithmetik, I, pp. 129-32). Here, I may seize the opportunity, in relation to all of the discussions of these 
Prolegomena, to refer to the Preface of Frege’s later work Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, vol. I (Jena, 1893)”. 
However, this reference to the Grundgesetze is problematic because Frege’s main argument against logical 
psychologism is based on the normative character of the laws of logic, an argument that Husserl dismisses in the 
Prolegomena. This is shown by the following excerpt from Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: “It is 
commonly granted that the logical laws are guidelines which thought should follow to arrive at the truth; but it is 
too easily forgotten. The ambiguity of the word “law” here is fatal. In one sense it says what is, in the other it 
prescribes what ought to be. Only in the latter sense can the logical laws be called laws of thought, in so far as 
they legislate how one ought to think. Every law stating what is the case can be conceived as prescriptive, one 
should think in accordance with it, and in that sense it is accordingly a law of thought. This holds for geometrical 
and physical laws no less than for the logical. The latter better deserve the title “laws of thought” only if thereby 
it is supposed to be said that they are the most general laws, prescribing how to think wherever there is thinking 
at all.” (Frege, 2013, p. XV) 
16 This dual influence is well documented in Husserl’s work, particularly in his 1903 review of M. Palagyi, in 
which he once again confirms the influence of Lotze’s and Bolzano’s contributions: “In particular, Lotze’s 
reflections about the interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms had a profound effect on me. Only by thinking out 
these thoughts from Lotze—and in my opinion he failed to get completely clear on them—did I find the key to 
the curious conceptions of Bolzano, which in all their phenomenological naivety were at first unintelligible, and 
to the treasures of his Wissenschaftslehre.” (Husserl, 1994, p. 201) 
17 Here’s the passage: “And so, we will have to do with Lotzes’ at first arguably strange view that arithmetic is 
only a relatively independent and from ancient times particularly sophisticated part of logic. In fact, in practical 
terms, it also represents the greatest instrument the human mind has ever devised for the purposes of deduction” 
(„Und so werden wir uns der zunächst wohl befremdlichen Auffassung Lotzes befreunden müssen, dass die 
thesis had a lasting effect on Husserl, as confirmed by several passages of his work, 
particularly in the Prolegomena.18 
III. Remarks on Husserl’s manuscript K I 59 (Microkosmos) 
The Husserl Archives in Leuven have preserved some of Husserl’s manuscripts, in which he 
provides a critical examination of Lotze’s Logic. Besides the annotations in the margins of his 
copy of Lotze’s Logic, the manuscript (K I 59), to which Husserl explicitly refers in his 
Prolegomena and which he intended to publish as an appendix of his Logical Investigations, 
provides a detailed analysis of the third book of Lotze’s Logic, titled “Vom Erkennen”.19 This 
manuscript is dated 1895-1897 and essentially consists in a critical commentary on the third 
book of Lotze’s Logic. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, which is incomplete in the 
transcription I am using in this study (KI 59, p. 4a-7a), Husserl briefly comments on some 
passages from §§ 314-316 of the second chapter, titled “The world of ideas,” and attributes to 
Lotze the merit of having stressed the decisive significance of the distinction between the 
subjective aspects of thought and the objective aspects of its propositional contents. Husserl 
also credited Lotze for having formulated the principle of the independence of Gedanken as 
the guiding principle of his logic and theory of knowledge. (KI 59, p. 5a) The second part, 
which occupies the major part of the manuscript, is a critical examination of §§ 316 f. of 
Lotze’s Logic. Husserl tries to show that several passages of Lotze’s Logic do not always 
harmonize with Lotze’s objectivism in his interpretation of Plato’s Ideas and that Lotze does 																																																																																																																																																																													
Arithmetik nur rein relativ selbständiges und von alters her besonders hoch entwickeltes Stück der Logik sei. 
Tatsächlich repräsentiert sie auch in praktischer Hinsicht das großartigster Instrument, das der menschliche Geist 
zu Zwecken der Deduktion ersonnen hat“). (Husserl, 2001b, p. 271-272) Husserl discusses several other aspects 
of Lotze’s logic in this lecture: § 44 („Inhaltsinterpretation dieser Form“ p. 152-153; § 45 „Die negativen 
kategorischen Sätze und die Bedeutung der Negation“, p. 155-157, 162. It is also worth recalling that, in his 
correspondence with Stumpf in the early 1890s as well as in a letter to Brentano published recently (Husserl, 
2015), Husserl emphasized the urgent need for a thorough reform of logic. He already considered the hypothesis 
that the arithmetica universalis “is a segment of formal logic.” (1994, p. 17) However, logic was at that time 
defined as a practical science, as “a symbolic technique” and not as a purely theoretical logic or as a theory of 
science, as will be the case starting from his 1896 lecture on logic. 
18 Husserl, 1982a, p. 108, 136 ff. In his Prolegomena and Formal and Transcendental Logic (1969, p. 83), 
Husserl refers to the following passage of Lotze’s Logic: “It is necessary, however, to expressly point out that all 
calculation is a kind of thought, that the fundamental concepts and principles of mathematics have their 
systematic place in logic, and that we must retain the right, at a later period, when occasion requires, to return 
without scruple upon the results that mathematics have been achieving, as an independently progressive branch 
of universal logic.” (Lotze, 1884, p. 26) 
19 Lotze’s Logic belongs to the last period of his work (1869-1881), during which he began to develop a 
comprehensive and systematic exposition of his philosophy, which he calls his system of philosophy. His 1874 
Logic is actually the first book of his “System of philosophy”; the second book is his Metaphysics, published in 
1879. The third volume, which has never been published, was to contain his aesthetic, moral theories as well as 
his philosophy of religion. His Logic is divided into three parts. In the first book, entitled “Pure logic,” Lotze 
describes systematically the formation of concepts, judgments, and inferences independently of their context of 
application, and especially of psychology. In the second book, “Applied logic,” Lotze explains how the 
particular contents of our representations are subject to the ideal forms of concepts, judgments, and inferences. 
The third book, entitled “On Knowledge,” addresses the question of how our thoughts can lay claim to an 
objective understanding of the objective correlates and causes of our representations, i.e., the real world. In the 
first chapter of this third book, Lotze discards the skeptical arguments by arguing, as Husserl does in his 
Prolegomena, that skeptical doubt presupposes a recognized truth and that skepticism is a contradictory doctrine. 
The second chapter, “The world of ideas” (§§ 313-321), contains Lotze’s well-known interpretation of Plato’s 
Ideas, which Lotze seeks to defend against the objection of hypostasis, as well as the famous notion of Geltung. 
 
not always respect the boundary between the objective and the subjective. Husserl claims that 
Lotze has not succeeded in standing out decisively from what he calls subjectivism in this 
manuscript, which was the main subject of the first part of this writing, according to Husserl’s 
indications in the manuscript (KI 59, p. 5a). 
The manuscript begins with the conclusion of this analysis of subjectivism, a position that 
Husserl accuses of omitting numerous basic distinctions essential to pure logic, especially 
those between thought and its objective content, between objective forms and subjective acts, 
between concept and proposition, object and state of affairs, existence and truth. (KI 59, p. 4a) 
In conceiving of judgement and inference solely in terms of mental acts of judging, 
subjectivism does not respect the boundary between psychology and logic. On the other hand, 
Husserl suggests that the normative character of logic is not a decisive argument against 
subjectivism and in favor of the separation between logic and psychology. In this context, 
Husserl criticizes Herbart for conceiving of logic as merely a normative science and for thus 
conflating the normative use of the laws of logic with their theoretical content. Husserl’s pure 
logic is a theoretical science and the main argument against psychologism that he elaborates 
during this period is not based on normativity, but rather on the ideality and objectivity of the 
laws of logic, which he conceives, in this manuscript, in terms of Geltung. Husserl credited 
Lotze for having introduced the main conditions that a pure logic has to meet in his 1874 
Logic, but, on the other hand, he criticized him for his subjectivist interpretation of logical 
forms (as mental or subjective movements of the thinking subject), relations, Gedanken (as 
product of judgment), inferences, etc. That is why Husserl considers that Lotze failed to draw 
all the logical and epistemological consequences from the objectivist position he attributes to 
Plato in his interpretation of Plato’s Ideas. 
Now, let us see what we can draw from Husserl’s remarks on the chapter “The world of 
ideas.” Let me begin with the cardinal distinction between proposition and concept, on which 
depend most of the distinctions mentioned above. In this chapter, Lotze criticizes Plato’s 
conception of Ideas as isolated concepts and argues that a concept only has a meaning in the 
context of a complete sentence or statement, which expresses a Gedanke and the content of a 
propositional attitude. The same criticism holds for Kant’s forms of thought, conceived as 
general concepts or categories. (Lotze 1884, p. 448) Plato’s world of eternal truths must 
necessarily take a propositional form insofar as propositions are the smallest unit of meaning 
and the only bearers of truth. Husserl conceives of propositions in terms of Bolzano’s 
propositions in themselves, as shown in this passage from his review of M. Palagyi, where 
they are defined as follows: 
under “proposition in itself” is to be understood what is designated in ordinary 
discourse—which always objectifies the Ideal—as the “sense” (“Sinn”) of a 
statement. It is that which is explained as one and the same where, for example, 
different persons are said to have asserted the same thing. Or, again, it is what, in 
science, is simply called a theorem, e.g., the theorem about the sum of the angles in 
a triangle, which no one would think of taking to be someone's lived experience of 
judging. (Husserl, 1994, p. 201) 
This is actually Husserl’s starting point in this manuscript, given that the objective character 
of propositions had been clearly established in his debate with Twardowski. His interest for 
Lotze in this manuscript primarily concerns the nature of propositions (in relation to Lotze’s 
Geltung), the logical conditions of the objective truth (truth in itself), the logico-psychological 
(or noetico-noematic) conditions of judgment, and the epistemological conditions for our 
knowledge of the external world in connection with Lotze’s theory of knowledge. 
Let us first examine the famous passage from § 316 of Lotze’s Logic, in which he introduces 
the concept of Geltung in the context of a distinction between four forms of effectivity 
(Wirklichkeit): 
For we call a thing Real (wirklich) which is, in contradistinction to another which 
is not; an event Real which occurs or has occurred, in contradistinction to that 
which does not occur; a relation Real which obtains, as opposed to one which does 
not obtain; lastly we call a proposition Really true which holds or is valid as 
opposed to one of which the validity is still doubtful. (Lotze, 1884, p. 439) 
Validity (Geltung) is a primitive form of effectivity and should therefore not be confused with 
the three other forms of effectivity. Lotze explains that the effectivity of Platonic Ideas (or 
propositions) should be understood in the sense of validity, which is a logical form that holds 
only for the truth of a proposition, and it is therefore independent of the existence of things in 
the outside world and of one’s mental states, which are called real in an ontological sense. 
(Lotze 1884, p. 448) Husserl fully agrees with Lotze’s interpretation (KI 59, p. 7a), and 
explains in his review of M. Palagyi that the notion of Geltung makes it possible to 
understand in a non-metaphysical way Bolzano’s Sätze an sich and the ideality of meaning, 
which he conceives of in the Logical Investigations as species of acts: 
The proposition thus relates to those acts of judgment to which it belongs as their 
identical meaning (Meinung) in the same way, for example, as the species redness 
relates to individuals of “the same” red color. Now, with this view of things as a 
basis, Bolzano's theory, that propositions are objects which nonetheless have no 
“existence,” comes to have the following quite intelligible signification: —They 
have the “Ideal” being (Sein) or validity (Gelten) of objects which are universals 
(“allgemeiner Gegenstände”)—and, thus, that being which is established, for 
example, in the “existence proofs” of mathematics. But they do not have the real 
being of things, or of dependent, thing-like Moments—of temporal particulars in 
general. (Husserl, 1994, p. 201-202) 
As for the notion of effectivity (Wirklichkeit), which Lotze associates not only with the truth 
of a proposition but also with the existence of things, it is conceived in terms of assent or 
affirmation (Wirklichkeit als Bejahung), as confirmed by the following passage quoted by 
Husserl in his manuscript: 
This use of language is intelligible; it shows that when we call anything Real, we 
mean always to affirm (Bejahung) it, though in different senses according to the 
different forms which it assumes, but one or another of which it must necessarily 
assume, and of which no one is reducible to or contained in the other. (Lotze, 
1884, p. 439) 
In his commentary on this passage, Husserl observed that this concept of ascent is only 
compatible with the validity and objectivity of Gedanken if one understands it as a “relation” 
and not as an act or an operation of positing (Operation der Setzung) in the Kantian sense, 
which Lotze discards because it would amount to making a proposition (Satz) the product of 
this operation. Husserl argues that the meaning of the “relation” to reality is one and the same 
relation while the differences (between the forms) reside in the matter to which one assents.20 
Husserl’s important remark takes on its full significance in light of his theory of judgment. 
Following Brentano, Husserl conceives of ascent (and of its opposite, negation) as a judgment 
and distinguishes the quality and the matter of an act of judgment or, to use a better-known 
distinction, between the noesis and the noema of an act. The term quality refers to the type of 
act, such as the act of judgment as opposed to a representation, a desire, an emotion, etc., 
while the term matter stands for the contents of an act, and in this case, for the propositional 
content of judgment. In his discussion of Twardowski, Husserl already distinguished, on the 
one hand, the quality of an act from its content and its object, and on the other hand, the 
sensory content (Twardowski’s depictive content or image) from the objective or logical 
content, which is similar, as I remarked, to Bolzano’s propositions in themselves. Specific as 
well to the class of judgment are their objects, which Husserl calls, after Lotze and Stumpf, 
states of affairs. What binds all the elements that are part of an act of judgment is 
intentionality, which constitutes the common structure to all acts and whose main property is 
aboutness or directionality (Richtung), i.e., the property of an act of being about something or 
being related to an object. This property belongs to the matter of an act insofar as its main 
function consists in conferring to an act its relation to an object. More precisely, the function 
of the propositional content of a judgment is to mediate the relation of an act to its object: 
Thinking only thinks of the content, i.e., it refers to it by means of this or that thought. The 
content of objective thoughts (such as concepts and propositions, for example) may change, 
but the object they (and by means of them and in a different way, the mental acts) mean, 
remains identically the same. [...] What that means, that thoughts such as different 
propositions, refer to the same object, thereof we have the most immediate and most evident 
knowledge, no image can make the evident even more evident to us, can claim to clarify 
what we directly see. (K I 59, p. 10a)21 
It follows that, from this perspective, the effectivity of a thing that exists, or that of a valid 
proposition, does not vary according to one’s attitude or ascent as Lotze argues, but according 
to the matter or content, which is always variable but whose “meaning relation” to effectivity 
remains the same. The invariant is the intentional relation of the act of judgment to its object, 
while its objective correlate, the judged state of affairs, varies as a function of its propositional 
content. The effectivity or existence of a judged state of affairs depends neither on ascent nor 
on what is taken for true, but rather on the validity of its propositional content (the state of 
affairs exists or is effective only when the proposition is valid). 																																																								
20 “In any case, we could only give our consent to these […] if, contrary to the wording, the meaning of the 
‘relation’ here, as in all cases, is only one, and that the differences lie only in the affirmed matter. I am far from 
thinking that the affirmation is an act” („Jedenfalls könnten wir dieser, Missdeutungen nicht unzugänglichen 
Rede unsere Zustimmung nur geben, wenn sie, dem Wortlaut entgegen, meinte, dass der Sinn der « Beziehung » 
hier wie in allen Fällen nur einer sei und dass die Unterschiede bloß in der bejahten Materie lägen. Die Bejahung 
als Akt liegt uns aber fern“). (K I 59, p. 8a-9a) 21	Das Denken denkt nur den Inhalt, d.h. es bezieht sich, auf ihn mittelst dieser oder jener Gedanken. Der Gehalt 
an objektiven Gedanken (z.B. an Begriffen, an Sätzen) kann wechseln, aber der Gegenstand, den sie (und mittels 
ihrer und in anderer Weise die Denkakte) intendieren, bleibt identisch derselbe. [...] Was das heißt, es beziehen 
sich Gedanken, etwa verschiedene Sätze, auf denselben Gegenstand, davon haben wir das unmittelbarste und 
sicherste Wissen, kein Bild kann uns das Evidente noch evidenter machen, kann das, was wir direkt sehen, 
verdeutlichen wollen). (K I 59, p. 11a) 
After having established the distinction between Sein and Geltung, Lotze claims that the 
concept of validity has lost nothing of its “wonderful character,” considering the difficulties 
that still remain with respect to the relationship between the being of things and that of 
general truths (the valid laws) that govern the relation between these things. It is in this 
context that Lotze speaks of an Abgrund der Wunderbarkeit (Lotze 1884, p. 446), to which 
Husserl attaches considerable interest in his commentary. For, Husserl sees in this remark an 
admission of failure by Lotze to satisfactorily explain the foundation (Grund) of the 
correspondence (Übereinstimmung) between the world of things (reality in the sense of being) 
and the world of thought (reality in the sense of validity). The source of this problem stems 
from the fact that, after having established the conditions for a pure logic in his chapter on the 
world of ideas, Lotze then relapsed into a form of subjectivism by creating a dependency 
between his Gedanken and the experiences of the knowing subject. This is what Husserl seeks 
to show in the second part of his commentary. (Husserl, 1975, p. 46) On the other hand, in so 
doing, Lotze creates an insurmountable gap between the field of objective realities and that of 
subjective thoughts, as Husserl claims in this passage: 
Of course, whoever partly gets stuck in subjectivism, anyone who, on the one hand, assumes 
things, events, worlds as existing in themselves, and, on the other hand, absorbs everything 
logical in subjective thinking activities, opens up for him, precisely as a consequence of the 
unclear half-heartedness, this abyss of wonder: Here the things, there our thinking. How do 
they come together, how to explain the miracle of their harmony? And from this point of view, 
it remains a miracle. But does one not realize that if everything logical subjectively volatilises, 
there is nothing left over from the being of things and again that nothing is left of the harmony 
between thinking and being? (K I 59, p 10a)22 
The answer to this last question again lies in Husserl's doctrine of intentionality, more 
precisely in the concept of correlation, which he uses here to demystify the Abgrund 
(strangeness) and to restore the harmony between thought and world. For, we are not dealing 
here with two incommensurable worlds, but rather with correlates of an intentional relation 
which “belong together and match each other, like truth and true things, the one as objective 
as the other, and both correlatively, i.e., inseparably related to each other”. (K I 59, p. 10a) 23 
																																																								
22 Freilich, wer im Subjektivismus zu einer Hälfte stecken bleibt, wer einerseits Dinge, Ereignisse, Welten als an 
sich existierend annimmt, und auf der anderen Seite doch alles Logische in den subjektiven Denktätigkeiten 
aufgehen lässt, für den öffnet sich, eben als Konsequenz der unklaren Halbheit dieser Abgrund von 
Wunderbarkeit : Hier die Dinge, dort unser Denken. Wie kommen beide zusammen, wie das Wunder ihrer 
Harmonie erklären? Und für diesen Standpunkt bleibt es ein Wunder. Aber merkt man denn nicht, dass wenn 
alles Logische subjektivistisch verflüchtigt wird, auch vom Sein der Dinge nichts übrig bliebe und wieder dass 
auch von der Harmonie zwischen Denken und Sein nichts übrig bliebe? (K I 59, p. 10a) 
23 “… gehören zusammen und stimmen zusammen, wie Wahrheit und wahre Sache, das Eine so objektiv wie das 
andere, und beide korrelativ, also untrennbar aufeinander bezogen”. (K I 59, p. 10a) Compare with what Husserl 
says about the mythical conception of Lotze’s two worlds in the draft of a preface to the Logical Investigations: 
“Another such presupposition in Lotze is a mythological metaphysics: he distinguishes a representational world 
(Vorstellungswelt), which has merely human-subjective validity, from a metaphysical world of monads in-
themselves, concerning which, under the label of metaphysics, we can venture metaphysical proposals by 
completely mysterious methods. Such proposals are inferior to novels, since novels have an aesthetic truth, and 
hence, an essential common ground with reality that is intelligible, something which is necessarily lacking in all 
such metaphysical fiction”. (Husserl, 1975, p. 47) 
 
We can see that most of the problems that Husserl attributes to Lotze’s theory of knowledge 
in this manuscript stem from the lack of an adequate theory of intentionality, which would 
have allowed Lotze to combine the psychological conditions for an act of judgment with the 
logical conditions for objective truth into a coherent structure. It would have also enabled him 
to develop a theory of knowledge immune to the objection of logical psychologism. We shall 
see that, in his later writings, Husserl criticizes Lotze and Bolzano for the absence of an 
adequate theory of knowledge, as well as for having neglected the elucidation of the basic 
concepts of logic and of the fundamental relation “between signification, signification 
moment, and full act of signifying.” (Husserl, 1994, p. 202; see Briefwechsel I, p. 39; 1975, p. 
46) Hence the repeated criticism that Husserl addressed to Lotze’s theory of knowledge, 
which he characterized as a hermaphrodite or a contradictory hybrid of pure and 
psychologistic logic. 
IV. Lotze and the criticism of logical psychologism in the Prolegomena  
The Halle period culminated in the publication in 1900-1901 of Husserl’s Hauptwerk, Logical 
Investigations, whose first volume, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, can be considered a plea 
against logical psychologism. I propose to address this issue by following the thread that I 
have unravelled since the beginning of this study, i.e., the connection to Brentano and 
especially to Stumpf, who published a treatise titled “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie,” 
which focuses on psychologism, the same year that Husserl published his Philosophy of 
Arithmetic. E. Holenstein (Hua XVIII, p. XIX) and D. Münch (2002, p. 50) rightly pointed 
out that Stumpf’s position on psychologism in this paper is not foreign to Husserl's criticism 
of logical psychologism in his Prolegomena. Moreover, Münch clearly saw that this issue was 
also central to Stumpf’s reflections in the first part of his habilitation thesis, in which he sides 
against J. S. Mill and Kant on the nature of mathematical axioms. The recent publication of 
Stumpf’s habilitation thesis raises many interesting questions, which have been the subject of 
several recent studies, notably by W. Ewen (2008), who emphasizes Stumpf’s relation to 
Frege and draws several parallels between the contributions of Stumpf, Husserl, and Frege to 
the foundation of mathematics and to the criticism of logical psychologism. (see W. Ewen, 
2008, 97 ff.) Ewen (2008, 13, 22) claims that Stumpf’s position on psychologism is closer to 
Frege’s anti-psychologistic position than to his student Husserl’s. Ewen’s argument rests on 
Stumpf’s and Frege’s relationship with Lotze during their stay in Göttingen in the early 
1870s. Historical testimony shows neither whether Frege attended Stumpf’s lectures on 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, which he taught for three consecutive years in Göttingen, nor 
whether he attended his lecture on “inductive logic with a particular focus on the problem of 
natural science,” which he taught during the summer semester of 1873. But since Ewen does 
not provide a clear definition of what is meant by “psychologism” and does not clearly expose 
Stumpf’s, Frege’s, and Husserl’s respective arguments against logical psychologism, there is 
no way to settle this debate. Nevertheless, we shall see that Stumpf’s position on 
psychologism is closer to Husserl’s than to Frege’s.  
Stumpf’s 1891 article allows us to establish a new connection between Lotze’s interpretation 
of Plato’s theory of Ideas and the issues underlying logical psychologism in the Prolegomena. 
Prior to the publication of this article, one can find traces of Lotze’s interpretation of Pato’s 
Ideas in Stumpf’s dissertation on Plato, published in 1869, and in his 1870 habilitation on 
mathematical axioms.24 Indeed, one of Stumpf’s central concerns in his dissertation The Idea 
of the Good in Plato is to defend Plato’s theory of Ideas against the objection of hypostasis, as 
Lotze already had in his Microcosmos and then in his 1874 Logic. (Stumpf, 1869, II, 2, p. 46 
ff.) In an article celebrating the centenary of Lotze’s anniversary in the Kant Studien, Stumpf 
suggested that the discussions he had with Lotze on his interpretation of Plato’s theory of 
Ideas were one of the motivating factors that led him to undertake his research on the nature 
of mathematical axioms in his habilitation thesis. (Stumpf, 1918, p. 7) And indeed, Stumpf’s 
investigation in this work is based on the cardinal distinction, which we discussed previously, 
between concept and proposition; this Lotzean distinction is at the heart of his criticism of 
psychologism in his article “Psychology and Theory of Knowledge”. Moreover, Husserl 
explicitly refers to Stumpf’s article in his Prolegomena (Husserl 1982a, § 18, pp. 335), and 
we shall see that Husserl’s Prolegomena (1982, pp. 40-42) adopted the same theoretical 
framework that we find in Stumpf’s 1891 article and in his Über die Grundsätze der 
Mathematik. Husserl’s debt to this student of Lotze in his Logical Investigations involves 
several central aspects of his logic and phenomenology (see R. Rollinger 1996), and it is no 
coincidence that this book is dedicated to Stumpf. 
Husserl refers twice to Stumpf’s 1891 article in his Prolegomena. The first reference is in a 
footnote to § 18, “The line of proof of the psychologistic thinkers,” in which Husserl points 
out that he uses the term “psychologism” without any “evaluative colouring” (abschätzende 
"Färbung"), following Stumpf. This remark seems to suggest that, unlike the anti-
psychologistic position defended by Kant, the neo-Kantians, and Frege, Husserl follows 
Stumpf in refusing to exclude the contribution of psychology to epistemological issues, as is 
confirmed by Husserl’s definition of phenomenology as a descriptive psychology in 
Brentano’s sense in his Logical Investigations. Husserl’s second reference pertains to a 
passage in Stumpf’s paper, where Stumpf (1891, 469) formulates his main argument against 
psychologism, i.e., that it can never lead to necessary truths. Husserl adds that even if Stumpf 
is mainly concerned, in this article, with the theory of knowledge and not with logic as such, 
this “is not an essential difference”. For, as Husserl points out in his review of Palagyi, the 
main target of his criticism of logical psychologism in his Prolegomena is also a kind of 
theory of knowledge.25 In this footnote, Husserl opposes Stumpf's position to that of Erdmann 
in his Logic, which he associates to an extreme form of subjectivism (Briefwechsel, III, p. 
132), and to a passage from Lotze’s Logic (Lotze, 1884, p. 467-468), which Husserl already 
quoted in his 1895-1897 manuscript (KI 59, p. 23a) to criticize Lotze’s concessions to 
																																																								
24 Although these two works by Stumpf were written before the publication of Lotze’s greater Logic in 1874, one 
can find in Lotze’s Microcosmos, first published in 1864, an outline of his interpretation of Plato’s Ideas in terms 
of Geltung, as well as the distinction between concept and proposition. (see Lotze, 1899, Book VIII, chapter I, p. 
325 ff.) 
 
25 “My work shows that my struggle against Psychologism is in no way a struggle against the psychological 
grounding of Logic as methodology, nor against the descriptive-psychological illumination of the origin 
(Ursprung) of the logical concepts. Rather, it is only a struggle against an epistemological position, though 
certainly one which has had a very harmful influence upon the way in which logic is done”. (Husserl, 1994, p. 
199) 
subjectivism. These two references to Stumpf thus suggest that Husserl’s criticism of logical 
psychologism in his Prolegomena follows the path blazed by Stumpf in his 1891 treatise.  
In order to better understand Stumpf’s critique of psychologism in 1891, I shall first say a few 
words on his habilitation thesis on the nature and origin of mathematical principles or axioms. 
His starting point is the following question: “Is there knowledge of scientific importance, 
which is in no way based immediately nor mediately on experience; and if there is such 
knowledge, what is its source?” (Stumpf, 2008, Bogen 1-1) It is divided into two parts. In the 
first part, Stumpf examines two antagonistic positions which prevailed at the time, namely J. 
S. Mill’s empiricism, according to which there is no knowledge that is not acquired mediately 
by induction, and Kantian transcendentalism, which claims that our knowledge of general 
principles of mathematics is based on synthetic a priori judgments. Stumpf rules out both 
options and seeks to show, in the second part, that axioms and mathematical propositions are 
analytic a priori; they are not acquired through experience but are the result of a process of 
deduction from concepts. In the critical part of this work, Stumpf raises the problem of the 
origin of the laws and principles of logic and mathematics as follows: if, as Mill thinks, these 
principles are inductive in nature, then they do not constitute necessary truths; if, on the 
contrary, they are necessary truths, then the question arises as to whether they are synthetic a 
priori judgments as Kant claims or analytic a priori propositions as Stumpf maintains. 
Against Mill, Stumpf argues that the axioms are not the result of an empirical generalization 
based on an inductive process and that arithmetic, like geometry, is a deductive science based 
on a priori and necessary truths, which are justified through the evidence of internal 
perception. (Stumpf, 2008, Bogen 5-4) Stumpf therefore agrees with Kant that axioms are 
necessary truths, but he denies that they are based on synthetic a priori judgments. 
Consequently, Stumpf’s fundamental argument against empiricism and transcendental 
criticism rests on the cardinal distinction between concept and proposition, and this distinction 
is of major philosophical significance in Stumpf’s subsequent work on the theory of 
knowledge. 
In his habilitation thesis, Stumpf is more concerned with delimiting the field of logic and 
mathematics from that of psychology. In this regard, Stumpf clearly distinguishes the question 
of the origin of concepts, which is a psychological question, from the questions that pertain to 
logico-mathematical domain, to which propositions and axioms belong. For, as Stumpf argues 
in Erkenntnislehre, one can agree with empiricism on the psychological origin of concepts 
while admitting all the same that there is a priori knowledge that is independent of 
experience. (Stumpf, 1939-1940, p. 126) Stumpf admits that the basic concepts of arithmetic 
(the concept of number) and geometry (the concept of space) have their origin in experience. 
In his Raumbuch, published three years after his habilitation thesis, Stumpf provides a 
demonstration of the thesis that the concept of space has a psychological origin. However, the 
position one takes on this issue is distinct from that which one adopts regarding the nature of 
propositions and necessary truths in the logico-mathematical domain. For, in this domain, one 
is solely concerned with axioms and propositions that can be deductively inferred, and one 
also assumes the origin of the axioms and their justification as necessary truths. Stumpf 
argued in 1870 that these axioms are analytic a priori propositions and that arithmetic and 
geometry are deductive sciences. 
Now, Stumpf’s starting point in his paper “Psychology and theory of knowledge” is the 
distinction between research on the origin of concepts, which is a task specific to psychology, 
and a theory of knowledge that is limited to the search for, and the justification of, “the most 
general and immediately evident truths” (Stumpf, 1891, p. 501), such as laws and axioms that 
are necessary for knowledge. Stumpf’s description of the debate on psychologism is based on 
this distinction. He opposes two schools of thought on the question of the relationship 
between the theory of knowledge and psychology: Kantianism26 which dissociates the theory 
of knowledge from psychology, and psychologism, which Stumpf defines in this paper as “the 
reduction of all philosophical investigation, and especially all epistemological investigations, 
to psychology”. (Stumpf, 1891, p. 468) The argument in favour of psychologism boils down 
to the idea that “knowledge is itself a mental process and accordingly the study of its 
conditions would be a psychological investigation”. (Stumpf, 1891, p. 468) On the other hand, 
the opponents of psychologism argue that psychological investigations can never lead to 
“knowledge of general and necessary truths”. (Stumpf, 1891, 469) Now, since the conditions 
of possibility for knowledge, i.e., the forms of intuition and thought, are themselves a priori 
and therefore not analyzable (Stumpf, 1891, p. 493), psychology is therefore useless for 
Kant’s followers.  
The position advocated by Stumpf in this debate consists in conceding to Kantianism that 
necessary truths are irreducible to facts, while admitting, as do the psychologists, that 
psychology is essential to the theory of knowledge. Hence the main mistake he imputes to 
Kantianism: to refuse the assistance of psychological research in the theory of knowledge. 
(Stumpf, 1891, p. 493, 500) The field of psychology is understood here in a sense that is 
broad enough to include sensory phenomena and mental functions because, in 1891, Stumpf 
did not explicitly distinguish the field of phenomenology from that of descriptive psychology. 
His main criticism of Kant thus focuses on the dichotomy between form and matter, and it is 
primarily the Kantian doctrine of phenomena (the manifold of intuition) that he holds 
responsible for its most obvious “mistakes”. In his 1891 article, Stumpf reiterates the main 
criticism raised against Kant in his Raumbuch, i.e., against his doctrine of space as a 
subjective form and his conception of sensations as amorphous and unstructured matter 
designed to support the synthetic and unifying activity of the understanding. (Stumpf, 1873, p. 
15 f.) However, this criticism does not make Stumpf an advocate of psychologism. For, 
Stumpf acknowledges that we must maintain a strict concept of necessity and thus oppose the 
reduction of the principles and laws of logic and of science in general to mere empirical 
generalizations. Stumpf explicitly refers to J. S. Mill and maintains that the laws of nature and 
the principles of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction, cannot be merely acquired 
by induction and are as such irreducible to a process of empirical generalization or “an 
accumulation of observations”. (Stumpf, 1891, p. 499-500) 
																																																								
26 The Kantian position that serves as a starting point in Stumpf’s paper “Psychology and Theory of Knowledge” 
is that of the neo-Kantian W. Windelband, another student of Lotze, who already used the term “psychologism” 
in 1877 in a pejorative sense to denounce those who, like Fries and Beneke, advocated a psychological 
interpretation of his doctrine. (W. Windelband, 1877, 224 f.) Windelband uses the term “psychologism” several 
times in this text, particularly in relation to the psychological interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of transcendental 
deduction. (W. Windelband, 1877, p. 248, 259) 
Now, Husserl’s starting point in his criticism of logical psychologism in his Prolegomena is 
very similar to Stumpf’s in his habilitation thesis, namely the opposition between J. S. Mill 
(Husserl, 1982, p. 40) and Kant (Husserl, 1982, p. 41-42) on the relation between logic and 
psychology. In the controversy over logical psychologism, this opposition is expressed 
concretely as normative anti-psychologism, which Husserl attributes to the Kantian tradition 
and sometimes to Frege,27 and logical psychologism, to which are associated the names of J. 
S. Mill, W. Wundt, A. Bain, and T. Lipps, for example. Following Husserl’s diagnosis, this 
controversy stems from the fact that both sides conceive of logic in two different ways: the 
psychologistic party only considers logic from the point of view of its method, i.e., as a 
technology dependent on psychology, while anti-psychologistic sympathizers only consider it 
from the point of view of its theoretical content, and therefore as a theoretical discipline 
entirely independent from psychology. To this difference between two conceptions of logic 
corresponds two different conceptions of the laws of logic: as these laws “serve as norms for 
our knowledge-activities, and laws which include normativity in their thought-content, and 
assert its universal obligatoriness”. (Husserl, 1982, p. 101) This distinction corresponds 
concretely to that of logic understood as a normative and practical discipline (as a Kunstlehre 
of knowledge) and of logic understood as a theoretical and ideal discipline. According to 
Husserl, the confusion underlying the psychologism–anti-psychologism debate can be 
explained by the fact that the first party, when it claims to base logic on psychology, only 
considers the practical-normative aspect of logic, while the arguments of the opposing party 
rely on logic understood as a theoretical discipline. Thus, if one only considers the practical 
aspect of logic, the claims of psychologism to partially base logic on psychology are 
legitimate. However, Husserl criticizes the anti-psychologistic partisans who conceive of 
logic strictly in normative terms, and thus ignore the essential difference between the proper 
content of logical propositions and their practical application (Husserl, 1982, p. 102), i.e., 
between the use of a proposition for normative means and its theoretical content, which is in 
principle separable from the idea of normativity. To acknowledge the validity of this 
distinction is to acknowledge that the one and only probative argument against logical 
psychologism does not rest on the opposition between the normative character of logical laws 
and the natural laws of psychology, but rather on the ideal character of the logical laws, 
which, as we have seen, is understood by Husserl in terms of Geltung. 
Kantians are thus right to emphasize the theoretical content of logic and to argue, against 
logical psychologism, that the propositions of logic are independent of the “properties of 
human nature in general”. But they are wrong to conceive of this propositional content and 
logic in general in terms of normativity. Husserl uses two arguments against normative anti-
psychologism. First, normativity is not a decisive argument against psychologism because 
“every normative and likewise every practical discipline rests on one or more theoretical 																																																								
27 Opinions diverge as to whether Frege would share ranks with the Kantians or with the phenomenologists. 
Some argue that Frege’s anti-psychologistic arguments are based on normativity and it is precisely on this point 
that he differs from the Husserl’s position. Others, such as M. Dummett for example, dispute this interpretation 
of Frege’s logic as a normative science. According to Dummett, there are no significant differences between the 
positions of Husserl and Frege on that issue: “a characterization of logic as a normative science is quite 
superficial, for logic is best regarded as the theoretical science underlying the relevant normative principles; the 
important question is the proper characterization of the subject-matter of this theoretical but non-prescriptive 
science”. (M. Dummett, 1991, p. 225) 
disciplines, inasmuch as its rules must have a theoretical content separable from the notion of 
normativity (of the ‘shall’ or ‘should’), whose scientific investigation is the duty of these 
theoretical disciplines”. (Husserl, 1982, p. 33) Thus, the principles of logic are not normative 
propositions, for any normative proposition presupposes a certain type of evaluation that 
refers to non-normative propositions and disciplines. Second, logic, understood as a 
normative discipline, in turn requires a psychological basis. Husserl is not saying that 
psychology provides its essential foundation, but he nevertheless concedes to psychologism 
that “psychology helps in the foundation of logic”. (Husserl, 1982, p. 45) Husserl's arguments 
against logical psychologism thus differ from Frege’s in his Grundgesetze, whose critique of 
psychologism rests on the normative character of logic. Frege argues that the main error of 
psychologism is to confuse the normative character of the laws of logic—what ought to be—
with the use of these laws to describe “what is”. Finally, unlike Lotze, Husserl, and Stumpf, 
Frege’s anti-psychologism amounts to entirely dismissing the field of mental phenomena, 
thereby creating an unbridgeable gap between this field of investigation and that of logic and 
philosophy as a whole. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Despite the many changes that marked the development of his phenomenology after his 
arrival in Göttingen in 1901, Husserl never renounced his Platonism and always recognized 
his debt to Lotze, as evidenced by a letter to P. Welch in 1933: 
What role had, in my development, my “Platonism”, my vigorous defense of a 
universal ontology, i.e., for the elaboration of intuition of essences (for the genuine 
a priori) in all spheres of knowledge, and what new meaning it gained in the 
matured transcendental phenomenology, thereupon my book Formal and 
Transcendental Logic (especially in the second part) will best enlighten you, 
although only “formal ontology” is in question in this book. For this “Platonism”, I 
am indebted to the well-known chapter in Lotze’s Logic, even if his epistemology 
and metaphysics have always very much repelled me. (Briefwechsel VI, p. 460-
461; see Husserl, 1969, p. 83, 146, 264) 
We also know that Husserl’s interest in Lotze’s theory of knowledge retained all its power, as 
shown by several lectures that he gave in 1912 in Göttingen (“Lotzes Erkenntnistheorie im 
Anschluss an das Buch der Logik 3. Lotzes”) and in 1922 in Freiburg. (see K. Schuhmann, 
Hua III / 1, p. xxxiii) However, Husserl’s remarks on Lotze after the publication of his 
Logical Investigations show the same ambivalence toward the philosophy of Lotze as the 
1895-1897 manuscript. For, while acknowledging his debt to Lotze’s logic and theory of 
knowledge, Husserl criticizes him in the same breath for his subjectivism and for his failure to 
overcome psychologism. Husserl believes that Lotze did not see all the philosophical 
implications of his own interpretation of Plato's theory of Ideas in his logic and was not able 
to draw all the right consequences for his theory of knowledge. Rather, as Husserl explains in 
the sketch of a preface to the Logical Investigations, after having established Plato’s theory of 
Ideas in all its purity, Lotze relapsed into a form of psychologism, namely anthropologism, by 
asserting a dependence of his Gedanken on the thinking subject. Hence the criticism that 
Husserl repeatedly addressed to Lotze’s theory of knowledge, namely of being “a product of 
the incompleteness that balks at ultimate consistency”. (Husserl, 1980, p. 50) 
In his writings after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl confirms the 
diagnosis of his 1895-1897 manuscript by attributing part of the failure of Lotze’s theory of 
knowledge to the absence of a theory of intentionality, as shown by his remarks on Lotze’s 
descriptive psychology and phenomenology. Husserl acknowledges that the starting point of 
his “ontological” research in the field of consciousness was Lotze’s idea that “the realm of 
sense-data, of color- and sound-data [are understood] as a field of ideal, and thus ‘ontological’ 
cognitions”. (Husserl, 1975, p. 43; 1977, p. 28) However, he deplores the fact that Lotze’s 
phenomenology “reduces itself to the reference to a few a priori relations in the sphere of 
sensuous contents”. (Husserl, 1980, p. 50) This amounts to saying that Lotze’s 
phenomenology, like Stumpf's (Hua III / 1, § 86; D. Fisette, 2005c), in the final analysis, only 
accounts for what Husserl called “primary relations” in his Philosophy of Arithmetic, i.e., the 
class of relations that have the character of primary contents and that have a “special 
phenomenal character”. But Lotze’s theory does not account for intentional relations 
belonging to the class of mental phenomena. That is why, despite of all his merits, Lotze 
never succeeded in elaborating a genuine phenomenology: 
Finally, that there could be such a thing as an eidetic doctrine of consciousness at 
all, and further an eidetic doctrine of the relations of consciousness and noema of 
consciousness, a constitution of objectivities, etc., of that he never had a notion and 
therefore had no notion of what we here call phenomenology. (Husserl, 1980, p. 
50) 
This passage sums up Husserl’s main criticism of Lotze, namely that he has not succeeded in 
reconciling the subjective and objective aspects of lived experience, i.e., the ideal noematic 
content, with the noetic aspect of the subject’s experience. Therefore, Lotze lacked a theory of 
intentionality, which represents the heart of Husserl's phenomenology. 
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